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Problem
Science (and also the myths concerning science) plays a dominant 
role in contemporary society. In  this study, the epistemological implications 
of quantum  physics were investigated in order to clear away some of the 
m yths concerning science.
Method
Q uantum  mechanics was studied. After analyzing the basic 
postulates of quantum  mechanics, several interpretations of the theory were 
examined. From quantum  mechanics and its interpretations several 
epistemological implications were drawn.
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Results
Several myths concerning science were identified. These include 
permanence of science, reductionism, determinism, absoluteness of logic, 
subject-object dichotomy, and the reality of the objects of a scientific model.
Conclusions
It is im portant for theologians to be aware of the myths concerning 
science. The main benefit of quantum  mechanics for theologians is in 
clearing away these myths firom the metaphysical conceptual space of 
theology.
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Science 1 still continues to play a dominant role in contemporary 
society. According to Langdon Gilkey, “the most im portant change in  the 
understanding of religious tru th  in the last centuries—a change th a t still 
dom inates our thought today—has been caused more by the work of science 
th an  by any other factor, religious or cultural.”2 To m any people the term  
‘science’ has come to denote something authoritative, reliable, or correct. 
Science for some has come to be viewed as the final arb iter in any intellectual 
pursuit, including theology. Specifically, according to positivists “it is only in 
the sciences-and especially in physics-that we have anything th a t can 
properly be called knowledge.”3 This is nothing new; even the earliest 
response of theology to science was to make discoveries of science the basis of
^The term  ‘science’ is used to denote physical science in particular, 
notWissenschaft, or scholarship in general.
^Langdon Gilkey, Religion and the Scientific Future: Reflections on 
Mvth. Science, and Theologv (New York: H arper & Row, Pub., 1970), 4.
3W. T. Jones, The Twentieth Centurv to W ittgenstein and S a rtre . 2d 
ed., A History of W estern Philosophy, vol. 5 (New York: H arcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Publishers, 1969), 220.
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C hristian  theology, as exemplified by Robert Boyle and William Paley.^ Even 
recently, theologian David Tracy proposed th a t “to continue to uphold a 
literal in terpretation  of the Genesis account is simply and irrevocably 
impossible for anyone who accepts the findings of the modem physical and 
life sciences.”2
Theology, as an all-inclusive discipline, can afford to neglect to 
examine such a claim a t its own peril. It is not to impose theology as the 
‘nueen’ of sciences, which Stephen Toulmin advises against; ra ther it is to 
reserve some critical foothold from which one can study the significance of 
science in  religious perspectives.^ Also it seems wise to heed the w arning of 
Jürgen M oltmann and avoid isolationism: “W hatever isolates itself, petrifies; 
and w hatever petrifies, dies.”'* The seriousness of some theologians and 
philosophers concerning this endeavor has been demonstrated by some 
recently held conferences.^
*0. A. Russell, “Science and Theology,” New Dictionary of Theology 
(1988), 626.
^David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism  in 
Theology (New York: H arper and Row, Publishers, 1988), 5.
^Stephen Toulmin, “The Historicization of N atural Science; Its 
Implications for Theology," in ParadiüTn Change in Theology; A Proposal for 
Discussion, ed. Hans Küng and David Tracy, trans. M argaret Kohl (New 
York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1991), 238.
4Jurgen  Moltmann, “Theology in Transitioa-To What?” in Paradigm  
Change in Theology: A Proposal for Discussion, ed. Hans Küng and David 
Tracy, trans. M argaret Kohl (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 
1991), 222.
SPor example, see Hans Küng and David Tracy, eds.. Paradigm  
Change in Theology: A Symposium for the F uture, trans. M argaret Kohl 
(New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1991); Jam es T. Cushing and 
E m an  McMullin, eds., Philosophical Consequences of Q uantum  Theory; 
Reflections on Bell’s Theorem (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
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3
This issue came closer to home for theologians when various so-called 
“scientific methodologies” such as historical criticism, “demythologization,” 
etc., developed w ithin theological circles. This issue has become a urgent 
problem for theologians to understand.
The Scope of the Thesis
Before considering the issues involved, an im portant distinction 
needs to be made between ‘theoretical science’ and ‘observational data.’ 
Observational da ta  include what we perceive both with and without 
sophisticated experimental apparatus. Theoretical science by contrast deals 
basically with models and theories th a t try  to explain’ the data. The 
statem ent “the sky is blue” is an observational statem ent provided we agree 
on the meaning o f ‘s k y ,  TdIu o ’, etc., but in saying “the blueness of the sky is 
due to the scattering of light from the air molecules,” one is already venturing 
into the realm of theoretical science. The scope of this paper is limited to 
theoretical science.
Although quantum  mechanics is employed as an illustrative example, 
the aim of the present work is to use this particular theory to elucidate some 
features of the method of science itself. The conclusions of this paper, it is 
hoped, will help to elim inate some myths about science.
The pertinent question to raise is this: W hat is the extent of 
applicability of science to theology in particular, and to w hat extent m ust 
theology itself be “scientific”? In other words, is there something in the 
process of science itself th a t requires conformity from theology? More 
specifically, the question is addressed to the issue of permanence of scientific
Press, 1989); John M. Mangum, ed., The New Faith-Science Debate: Probing 
Cosmologv. Technology, and Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1989).
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models, reductionism, determinism, the reliability of logic, subject-object 
dichotomy, and reality of accepted scientific models. The above 
characteristics are generally accepted as the hallm ark of science. Therefore, 
it is im portant to see if  this general opinion is warranted.
The Organization of the Thesis 
This paper is organized as follows. First, quantum  mechanics is 
introduced. The treatm ent of the subject is brief and technical term s are kept 
to a minimum. Then several interpretations of quantum  mechanics are 
introduced. Finally, several general conclusions with their relevance to 
theology are discussed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
AN INTRODUCTION TO QUANTUM MECHANICS 1
Description
Q uantum  mechanics, in short, is the physics of the microscopic world, 
the world of protons, neutrons, electrons, photons, etc. Previous to the 
emergence of quantum  mechanics, it was commonly believed th a t Newtonian 
physics, a  tim e-tested highly successful theory, gives an adequate description 
of the universe including the microscopic world. But it is now well 
established th a t Newtonian physics is grossly inadequate to account for the 
microscopic phenomena.
One of the most intriguing things about the universe a t this level is 
th a t the microscopic “objects” such as protons, electrons, etc., seem to behave 
in ways th a t contradict our common sense, th a t is to say, our ordinary way of
iThe m aterial in this section is fairly familiar w ithin the physics 
community. But since this paper is w ritten  with non-physicists in mind I 
have adapted the m aterial to the appropriate audience. The following books 
are recommended for anyone who wants to study the m aterial in depth. For a 
person who feels uncomfortable with mathem atics these books are 
recommended: Nick Herbert, Quantum  Realitv: Bevond the New Physics 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1985); A lastair I. M. Rae, Quantum  Phvsics: 
Illusion or Realitv? (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 
. For those who are mathematically initiated, the following books are 
recommended: Leonard I. Schifif, Quantum  Mechanics. 3d ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1955); Claude Cohen-Tannoudji, Bernard Diu, and Franck 
Laloë, Q uantum  Mechanics, vol. 1, trans. Susan Hemley, Nicole Ostrowsky, 
and Dan Ostrowsky (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977).
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looking a t reality. It was Niels Bohr, one of the main architects of quantum  
mechanics, who said th a t “anyone who has not been shocked by quantum  
physics has not understood it.”^
The Two-Window Experiment 
It seems reasonable, at this point, to first look a t the basic 
constituents of this microscopic world. Most people conceive of protons, 
electron, etc. as somewhat like billiard balls or tennis balls of different sizes. 
In order to see w hether or not this conception is adequate, a thought 
experiment^ is utilized. One may imagine a room with two open windows 
installed side by side with a white wall divider installed parallel but close to 
the windows. And one may further imagine th a t some people were provided 
with several thousand tennis balls with wet red paint on them. If these 
people (positioned outside the room) threw the balls toward the windows, 
some of the balls would enter through the windows and h it the wall divider. 
At the end one would expect to find red paint spots in two general areas on 
the white wall divider right behind the two windows (figure 1).^ There is 
nothing surprising in this result.
^Niels Bohr, quoted in Ronald C. Pine, Science and the Human 
Prospect (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989), 214.
2A thought experiment is a  device used by theoretical physicists to 
dem onstrate the logical consistency, the philosophical implications, etc., of a 
conceived situation without actually carrying out the experiment. The results 
of the thought experiment in this section, however, have been well 
established experimentally. Therefore, the thought experim ent here is used 
for a  pedagogical purpose.
^There are numerous illustrations of this experiment. For more 
detail, see the excellent discussion in Richard Feynman, Robert Leighton, and 
M atthew Sands, The Fevnman Lectures on Phvsics. vol. 3 (Menlo Park, CA: 
Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1965), 1-4 to 1-9.






tennis balls windows wall
Figure 1. Diagram for the tennis ball experiment.
One may further repeat the experiment, this time blind-folding 
everyone (including the spectators). Even though the two spots may be 
fainter (since the “throwers” are more likely to miss the windows because 
they cannot see) we would still expect the same two spots to appear on the 
wall after the experiment.
The Double-Slit Experiment and DifHcultv 
If electrons are somewhat like tennis balls one would expect to find 
analogous results under sim ilar circumstances. For all other non-blind­
folding cases, 1 the experimental results are easily explainable by assuming 
th a t electrons do behave like tennis balls. But when one performs this 
“double-slit” (a slit is simply a “window” for electron, th a t is, a microscopic 
window) experiment by bombarding electrons without m easuring which of the 
two slits the electrons go through (corresponding to the ‘blindfold’ 
experiment) one gets an interference pattern (a series of evenly spaced spots 
instead of two spots behind the two windows). The cause for such an
iFor example, if one “window” is blocked, there appears basically one 
spot, etc.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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interference pattern  is shown to be a wave.l But this presents a conceptual 
difficvdty; how can electrons behave like a  wave, especially since electrons do 
behave “almost” like particles? One possible explanation is to say th a t 
electrons behave like water molecules in an ocean wave. That w ater is 
composed of w ater molecules is well known. Therefore, it is clear th a t each 
molecule can be considered to be particle-like (that is, like a tennis ball), yet 
w ater molecules may collectively behave like a  wave (ordinary w ater wave). 
This amounts to saying th a t the tennis balls used in the thought experim ent 
collectively might act like a wave producing a series of paint spots on the 
wall.
One may go further with this thought experiment to test if  th is idea 
is feasible. If this is the true picture of electron’s behavior, we could test it as 
follows: if  the tennis balls are cast one by one, any collective influence can be 
elim inated thus producing non-wave like behavior, th a t is, two spots near the 
two windows. But when this double-slit experiment is performed with one 
electron passing through the slit system a t any one time^ (corresponding to 
throwing a tennis ball at one time through the two-window system), we still 
obtain an interference pattern. This produces a serious difficulty with the 
particle picture of the electron. Since in other experimental set-ups the 
electron’s behavior is consistent with the particle picture, physicists named 
this strange behavior “wave-particle duality.” No one really knows how to 
reconcile this strange picture with ordinary conceptual images and categories.
iThis is not to say th a t other factors cannot cause such an 
interference pattern. It is to say that, as far as the present sta te  of 
knowledge of physics is concerned, a wave is the most natural explanation for 
such an interference pattern.
2lt is technologically possible to perform this by reducing the 
intensity  of electron beam.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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One encouraging aspect of this conundrum is tha t not only electrons, bu t also 
protons, neutrons, photons (light), etc., behave in the exact same m anner. 
Some even call these “particles” as “wavicles,” th a t is to say, they are not 
particles nor waves but sometimes act like particles and sometimes as waves. 
In laym an’s term s, physicists do not really have a coherent picture (tha t is, 
consistent with “common sense”) of w hat these wavicles look like. I t is, 
therefore, understandable why ever since the emergence of quantum  
mechanics there have been endless debates on w hat the theory “m eans.” This 
is in  sta rk  contrast with Newtonian physics which had, relatively speaking, a 
straightforw ard “meaning.”
Scientific Methodologv 
Because quantum  mechanics presented conceptual difficulties, there 
have been m any objectors to quantum  mechanics, including Albert Einstein, 
who u ttered  the famous statem ent, “God doesn’t  play dice.” Since the sta tus 
itself of quantum  mechanics as a scientific theory is questioned (though not 
its successfulness), it is instructive to look a t the method of science itself. ̂  
Details aside, basically the process of science can be said to begin with 
observation. Then in order to explain what is observed one proposes a 
hypothesis. Then the consequences of the hypothesis are tested. A negative 
result may lead to either the discarding of the hypothesis or a modification of 
it. A positive result allows one to go through the loop all over again. It is 
interesting to note th a t the number of times one has to go through the loop 
before the sta tus of the hypothesis becomes elevated to th a t of a theory is 
arbitrary. In other words, this is an infinite loop.
iPor a concise discussion of the structure of science, see Pine, 42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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One may also observe th a t w hat are actually tested in science are the 
consequences of a hypothesis, not the hypothesis itself, l One may obser\'e 
th a t things drop to the floor, but w hat is observed is not gravitational force 
itself but it may be understood as a consequence of the idea of gravity .2
Also one observes th a t any “theory” is tentative in th a t there is no 
point when one can say th a t a particular scientific model has been proven. In 
fact, the very concept of “proof” is a m athematical concept which is valid only 
in m athem atical systems. In other words, we have chosen to accept 
something as “proof’ w ithin that relatively “perfect” and highly “artificial" 
system. Mathematics does not have to correspond to reality. But there is 
more of the “untidiness” of reality when it comes to science.
Moreover, there is no criterion to determine if  an idea is acceptable 
except the workability of the hypothesis. In other words, if  I assume th a t 
there are pink elephants all over the universe and assign precise and testable 
properties to them  which explain the data a t hand, it is accepted as a good 
scientific model. It is interesting to note th a t if one takes th is hypothesis of 
pink elephants seriously then the first thing one has to do is to make the 
elephants invisible in order to make it consistent with observational data  (we 
do not see these pink elephants after all).
l i t  is im portant to be reminded th a t only theoretical science is 
concerned here. That there is a moon is an  observational “fact,” but tha t 
there is an atom is a theoretical statem ent since it is impossible for atoms to 
be seen in the ordinary sense because the dimension of an  atom is much 
smaller than  the visible wavelength. (In order to be seen, the dimension of 
the object m ust be comparable or larger than the wavelength of visible light 
since the light has to reflect off the object and enter the eye in order to be 
seen by hum an beings.)
2ft is interesting to note th a t in general relativity one introduces a 
curvature of spacetime instead of gravitational force. In other words, there is 
no such thing as gravitational force in general relativity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Five Postulates of Quantum Mechanics
In quantum  mechanics, there is something akin to this theory of 
invisible pink elephants. This is called the wave function. Thus we come to 
the first postulate of quantum  mechanics.^
The F irst Postulate of 
Q uantum  Mechanics
In quantum  physics, a physical state is described by a wave function. 
This is not an  ordinary wave that one can see, but an unobservable one. The 
amplitude of this wave a t a point in space is related to the probability of 
finding the associated “wavicle” there.2 This picture is alien to the 
Newtonian picture and also to common sense. In ordinary physics, in order to 
describe a ball, one only has to note where the ball is (position) and how fast 
and in which direction the ball is moving (velocity). But in order to describe 
an electron, physicists use a mathematical function that describes the 
distribution of the “wave” throughout space. In order for this “pink elephant” 
theory to be useful there m ust be a way to know how the elephants move.
This is accomplished by the second postulate.
The Second Postulate of 
Q uantum  Mechanics
The time evolution of the wave function is governed by the 
Schrodinger equation. One would expect this equation to be different from 
the classical equation which describes how a tennis ball moves. But up to
^Those who are interested in a more rigorous presentation of these 
postulates may refer to Cohen-Tannoudji, Diu, and Laloë, 215-223.
2The amplitude of the wave function a t a point squared is equal to 
the probability per unit volume of finding the corresponding particle there.
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here, the quantum  system is deterministic. All th a t is claimed so far is th a t 
instead of describing a tennis ball by specifying where it is and how it moves, 
we choose to look a t the wave function (pink elephant) associated with a 
wavicle and how it moves.
However, it has been noted in  the discussion above, th a t the act of 
observation seems to disturb the system as to yield a different outcome (one 
may recall th a t when “blindfolds” were not used two spots were obtained 
from the experiment whereas when “blindfolds” were used one obtained an 
interference pattern). So the next three postulates are introduced to explain 
these observational data.
The Third Postulate of 
Quantum Mechanics
Any act of measurement performed on a “wavicle” is represented by a 
m athem atical operator acting on the corresponding wave function. In other 
words, any act of measurement on a “wavicle” has a well-defined 
m athem atical meaning.
The Fourth Postulate of 
Quantum Mechanics
If there are several possible results of the measurement, the 
particular wave function is a linear combination of the pure states l 
associated with these results.^ The probability^ of obtaining a particular
lA pure state (for a measurement) is a  wave function which yields a 
specific resu lt when the measure is performed. For example, the pure state 
yielding “th ree” for a quantum  dice, say I 3>, has 100 % chance of yielding 
“th ree” when the dice is cast but has no chance of yielding anything else.
2A wave function can be decomposed into different sets of pure states. 
This is sim ilar to the situation of a three-dimensional vector (an “arrow”)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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value when making a m easurem ent is simply the component of decomposition 
squared. For example, if one throws a quantum  die, the wave function, say 
I of the die is a combination of six pure states, say 11>, I 2>, 13>, 14>
, 15> , and 16> , each associated with different outcomes of die-throwing. If 
the dice is “fair,” th a t is, normal, then each component is the square root of 
one-sixth, th a t is, l\|/> = V l/6  11> + V l/6  i 2> + V l/6  I 3> + V l/6  I4> 4- 
V l/6  I5> + V l/6  I6>. But if  the dice is “loaded,” then the s ta te  associated 
with the favored outcome will have a higher value for the corresponding 
component of decomposition. (For example, if  a dice is loaded so th a t the 
outcome will always be “two,” then the component of the decomposition of the 
state associated with “two” will be o ne, whereas the rest of the components 
will be zero. In other words, I Vj/> = 12> .)
The Fifth Postulate of Q uantum  
Mechanics
When a measurem ent is made and a particular value obtained, the 
wave function right after the m easurem ent is a “pure” state  (or pure wave 
function) composed of only the state corresponding to the value obtained. In 
other words, when a m easurem ent is made on a “particle,” then the wave 
function, by the very process of measurement, collapses to a  pure state. For 
example, for the quantum  dice mentioned above, if the first throw resulted in 
“two,” then the wave function right after the first throw is I 2>. This is called
being able to be described by several different coordinate systems. The 
particular set chosen depends on the kind of m easurem ent taken. .
3lt is assumed here and in the example which follows th a t the space 
part of the wave function has been integrated over.
iThis “ket vector” (from the word ‘bracket’) is a  standard notation for 
a wave function. One may read it as \\i or ket Y-
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the “collapse of the wave function.” How and where this collapse occurs 
brings out endless philosophical discussions^ as one will soon see.
Explanation of the Double-Slit Experiment 
The real test for quantum  mechanics is whether or not one can use 
the above postulates to explain the double-slit experiment. When a 
m easurem ent is not performed as to which of the two slits the electron is 
passing through, then the wave function goes through the system  as a 
superposition of two pure states,2 thereby resulting in an interference 
pattern.3 But if the m easurement is made to determine which of the two slits 
the electr on is passing through, then there is a collapse of the wave function 
due to the m easurem ent process itself. There is no interference pattern  
because there is now one pure state instead of a  superijosition state.
Peculiarities of Quantum Mechanics 
The picture emerging from quantum  mechanics is disturbing and 
challenging especially for a mechanistic view of the universe (such as 
Newtonian physics) in several different aspects. Contrary to Newtonian 
physics, according to quantum  physics, any m easurem ent carried out on a 
system (a system may be anything from a single electron to many “wavicles”
iThis philosophical problem is called the “m easurem ent problem.”
2This situation is analogous to the “fair” die. Since the electron has 
equal probability of passing through slit #1 as th a t of passing through slit #2, 
one has to construct the wave function as a superposition of two states.
3lt is standard knowledge in physics th a t a superposition of a specific 
type of wave function required in quantum  mechanics (vectors in Hilbert 
space, to use the technical term) leads to an interference pattern . But if the 
superposition is no longer present, then one no longer has interference 
pattern. This has to do with the fact tha t the square of the wave function a t  a 
point in space is related to the probability of finding the “wavicle” there.
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interacting with a complicated experimental apparatus) disturbs the system 
and the way it disturbs is related to the result of the m easurem ent. In 
Newtonian physics, if  one knows the initial position and velocity of an object, 
w hether or not one makes an observation on the object during flight does not 
m ake any difference to the outcome. After all, people’s common belief about 
science indicates th a t science m ust be objective. If one throws a  ball from the 
same position with the same velocity, one would not expect the ball to land at 
a different site ju s t because one chose to blindfold oneself after the ball is 
already thrown. Or ju st because one decides to watch (not cheer) a football 
game, one does not expect to influence the outcome of the game itself. But in 
quantum  physics, any measurement introduces a change in a fundam ental 
way such th a t it becomes a different system altogether. Even if  one chooses 
to observe, for example, instead of choosing not to observe, the very act of 
observation alters what one wants to observe.
Another interesting feature of quantum  physics is th a t a t this level 
even if  one knows everything knowable within the theory itself, it is not 
usually enough to predict exactly what will happen. ̂  Ordinarily, one a t best 
knows the probabilities of various o u t c o m e s . 2 In Newtonian physics if one 
performs an experiment under identical conditions, exactly the same result is 
obtained every time. Therefore, not being able to predict the outcome exactly, 
in the case of dice-throwing for example, is an indication th a t there is some 
missing information. If one obtains the value of the elasticity of the dice and
lAn exception occurs when a wave function is in a pure state (right 
after a  m easurem ent is taken for example). Then the probability of obtaining 
the associated value is one, th a t is, we know what will be the outcome 
exactly. But generally a wave function is a combination of different states.
2Qne may recall the example of the quantum  die; only the 
probabilities of various outcomes are known.
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the table, the angle the dice hits the table, etc., it is theoretically possible, 
even if  practically cumbersome, to predict exactly w hat num ber will tu rn  up. 
In classical physics probability is a mere convenience and there is no 
theoretical reason why exact predictions cannot be obtained. If  there is 
uncertainty, it is an indication th a t there is missing information somewhere. 
In quantum  physics, there is a theoretical lim itation in one’s ability to 
predict. Probability is an intrinsic part of the theory itself.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III 
INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICSl
Diversity of Interpretation 
Relatively speaking, there were no philosophical controversies 
regarding Newtonian mechanics. Mass, force, etc., had a natu ra l 
in terpretation  which can be easily reconciled with common sense. But from 
its very beginning, there has never been a universally accepted in terpretation 
of quantum  mechanics. M urray Gell-Mann observes.
All of modem physics is governed by th a t magnificent and  thoroughly 
confusing discipline called quantum  m echanics.. . .  I t has survived all 
tests and there is no reason to believe th a t there is any flaw in it. . .  . We 
all know how to use i t  and how to apply it to problems; and so we have 
learned to live with the fact th a t nobody understands it.2
In other words, there is no controversy when it comes to using  quantum
mechanics; but there is no agreement as to what the theory means.
It is, therefore, much more im portant when discussing quantum
mechanics to consider various interpretations of quantum  mechanics. That
theory and its interpretation are inseparable is a truism . But it becomes
tThe following books contain concise overviews of various 
interpretations: Nick H erbert, Quantum  Realitv: Bevond the New Physics: 
Ronald C. Pine, Science and the Human Prospect. One book with some 
m athem atics is, Edward Gettys, Frederick J . Keller, and Malcolm J . Skove, 
Physics: Classical and Modem (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1989). The classification scheme in  this paper for various schools will follow 
closely the one used by Herbert.
^Murray Gell-Mann, quoted in Pine, 218.
17
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explicitly necessary, when it comes to quantum  mechanics, to consider the 
theory together with its variegated interpretations.
Certainly, the situation is much more complicated in the case of 
quantum  mechanics than the case of Newtonian physics because of the many 
interpretations of the former. J. C. Polkinghorne compares this situation to 
th a t of having a beautiful palace without being certain about its foundation, 
w hether it is on bedrock or sand.^ The problem lies in the simple fact th a t its 
original interpretation seemed so absurd th a t many had difficulty accepting 
it. People seem to have difficulty accepting w hat does not appear to make 
sense. But one should take the warning of Richard Feynman to heart: “The 
‘paradox’ is only a conflict between reality and your feeling of what reality 
‘ought to be.’”2
There is a diverse body of interpretations regarding the meaning of 
quantum  physics. Several of these are mentioned briefly.
The Copenhagen Interpretation
The Copenhagen interpretation was the original in terpretation of 
quantum  mechanics and this view, and several variations of this 
interpretation, are held by the majority of physicists. This interpretation, 
therefore, is the “orthodox” interpretation. According to one major proponent 
of this school there is only one interpretation of quantum  mechanics, namely 
the Copenhagen interpretation, since physical theory consists of the
IJ. C. Polkinghorne, The Quantum World (London: Longman Group,
1984), 1.
2Richard Feynman, quoted in Pine, 221.
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formalism of the model and the (original) meanings attached to the symbols. ̂  
According to this interpretation quantum  mechanics describes neither the 
micro-world nor the ordinary world; it describes the relationship between the 
two.2 This school insists th a t one’s ordinary concepts are not applicable to 
the quantum  system. One of the main architects, W em er Heisenberg, 
attributed  this to the inadequacies of the language formed by ordinary 
experiences. He said.
The root of the difficulty is the fact tha t our language is formed from our 
continuous exchange with the outer world. We are a part of this world, 
and th a t we have a language is a primary fact of our life. This language 
is made so th a t in daily life we get along with the world; it cannot be 
made so that, in such extreme situations as atomic physics, or distant 
stars, it is equally suited. This would be asking too much.3
To insist th a t quantum  systems^ behave like ordinary macroscopic 
systems is a unw arranted extrapolation into a region of which we have no 
direct experience. According to Heisenberg, what we observe in our 
experiments is not nature itself but nature exposed to our methods of 
questioning it.-'’
In addition, the paradoxes generated by quantum  mechanics are 
natu re’s way of telling us th a t we need m utually contradicting sets of systems
iPaul Buckley and F. David Peat, A Question of Phvsics: 
Conversations in Phvsics and Biology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1979), 19.
^Herbert, 161.
^Buckley and Peat, 9.
'̂ “Quantum  systems,” according to this school of interpretation, refer 
to the microscopic world, the world of protons, electrons, etc. Some schools of 
interpretation propose tha t everything is quantum  mechanical, including the 
world of desk, chair, etc.
SPine, 226.
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to understand nature. For instance, in order to understand the behavior of 
an electron, one has to use two contradictory pictures: the wave picture and 
the particle picture. This idea is called complementarity.
The Copenhagen interpretation is also anti-reductionistic in th a t a 
picture in  biology may be ju st another picture, ̂  not necessarily reducible to 
physics.2
As to the m easurem ent problem, the Copenhagen in terpretation says 
th a t the collapse of the wave function occurs in m easuring devices. Reality, 
according to this view, is created by the act of observation. Physicist John 
W heeler says, “the old word observer simply has to be crossed off the books, 
and we m ust put in the new word participator. In this way we’ve come to 
realize th a t the universe is a participatory universe.
This school is anti-realist in th a t it denies any deeper underlying 
“quantum  reality” beyond w hat can be measured experimentally. In other 
words, there is no reality in the absence of an observation. According to the 
Copenhagen interpretation, electrons, protons, etc.. are mere theoretical 
constructs.*^ According to Heisenberg, the idea of “fundam ental reality” itself
iThis is contrary to the traditional view which held th a t ultim ately 
biology, chemistry, etc., is reducible to physics. In other words, everything in 
biology, chemistry, and other sciences can be explained, a t least in theory, 
using physics.
2lbid., 226-227.
^Buckley and Peat, 55.
**For an interesting discussion of this school, see Herbert, 16-17, 158-
168.
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arises from unw arranted extrapolation of our ordinary experience into the 
quantum  realm. 1
Niels Bohr, one of the most famous proponents of this school, said: 
“There is no quantum  world, there is only an  abstract quantum  description.”2 
Some physicists do not even believe in the ontic nature of “things” like 
electrons and protons. For them, this does not mean th a t physics is 
subjective. I t simply means th a t physics is objectless.^
Physicist David Mermin summarizes the interpretation this way: “We 
now know th a t the moon is demonstrably not there when nobody looks.”4
Neo-Realism
Proponents of neo-realism include David Bohm,® Albert Einstein,
Max Plank, Louis de Broglie, and Erwin Schrodinger. They do adm it the 
successfulness of quantum  mechanics in explaining obsen/ational data. But 
they reject the sharp dichotomy between the ordinary world and the quantum  
world th a t the Copenhagen interpretation makes. This school holds th a t 
everything is ordinary and the puzzling aspects of quantum  mechanics are 
due to the incompleteness of the theory.® But the number of experimental 
evidences supporting quantum  mechanics is increasing. In particular, the
^Buckley and Peat, 9.
^Niels Bohr, quoted in H erbert, 17.
^Herbert, 162.
■^David Mermin, quoted in Herbert, 17.
®David Bohm has proposed more than  one interpretation of quantum  
mechanics.
^Herbert, 22-24.
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Aspect experiment seems to support quantum  mechanics and affirms it as 
complete. 1 J . S. Bell showed th a t if electrons, etc., are ordinary objects then 
superlum inal (faster-than-light) waves are unavoidable.^ This spells more 
trouble, since it undermines causality as we understand it.^
Realitv as an Undivided Wholeness 
There are several varieties in the school of reality as an undivided 
wholeness, such as Wheeler’s wormhole picture,'* Penrose’s twistor theory,^ 
and the mystical brand of Capra® and Zukav.^ But here Bohm’s picture is 
mainly considered. This school accepts an observer-created reality, thereby 
dissolving the boundary between subject and object. According to this view, 
there is no causal hook-up.® Everything in the universe is connected 
undim inished with everything else. Whereas in classical physics, object, 
equipment, and observing human being are all separate, in “quantum
*For an interesting discussion on this, see Pine, 233-235.
^Herbert, 244.
®This can be understood easily via relativistic spacetime diagram. 
Those who are interested may refer to any introductory book on special 
relativity. (See, for example, Delo E. Mook and Thomas Vargish, Inside 
Relativitv [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987], 88-95.)
'*F. David Peat, Einstein’s Moon: Bell’s Theorem and the Curious 
Q uest for Quantum  Realitv (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1990), 135-140.
Sibid., 140-142.
®Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Phvsics: An Exploration of the Parallels 
Between Modem Phvsics and Eastern Mvsticism (Boulder, CO: Sham bhala 
Publications, 1983).
^Gary Zukav, The Dancing Wu Li Masters: An Overview of the New 
Phvsics (New York: Bantam Books, 1979).
®Herbert, 19.
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mechanics one sees th a t the process by which these different things would 
in teract cannot itself be analyzed in detail. It is whole and indivisible.” ̂
W ith the idea of non-local “in-form-ation,” the proposed basic paradigm  of the 
universe is th a t of an  “organism of great subtlety.”̂
I t is also interesting to note that many in terpreters of quantum  
mechanics are quite friendly toward religion, in contrast to their Newtonian 
predecessors. David Bohm considers religion and science to be essentially the 
same in their attem pts to obtain wholeness, even though they both have been 
unsuccessful.3 According to him, quantum  mechanics possibly implies such a 
wholeness, not only between an individual and his/her environment, but also 
between inanim ate objects. The whole simply “cannot be analyzed into 
separate parts with preassigned interactions.”*̂ Bohm sees, in this new 
physics, a chance to wholeness. He claims that it “is not incompatible with a 
religious approach. . . . On the contrary, it is more compatible with this 
[religion] than it is with a mechanistic approach. So a t least fragm entation 
between science and religion may perhaps thus be capable of being healed.”^
Quantum Logic
Another group of people believes th a t the key to the puzzle lies in 
discovering a new logical system different from the ordinary one. In other
iBuckley and Peat, 132.
2Peat, 155.
^David Bohm, “Fragm entation and Wholeness in Religion and in 
Science,” Zvgon 20 (1985): 125-127.
4lbid., 128
Sibid., 130.
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words, if  our logical system is to survive and continue to have relevance to 
reality, it needs to go through a major revision. So far there does not seem to 
be a completely successful revision, l
Consciousness^Created Realitv 
The major proponent of consciousness-created reality is John von 
Neumann. This interpretation is sim ilar to the Copenhagen interpretation. 
But th is view says tha t everything is quantum  mechanical, including 
ordinary objects. The major difference is th a t this view states th a t only an 
apparatus endowed with consciousness is privileged to create reality, not any 
m easuring device.^ According to von Neumann, only the presence of 
consciousness can help to solve the “m easurem ent problem.”  ̂ So, in effect, if 
there are no conscious beings around and only a detector, say a telescope, is 
operating, reality is still being created by the detector according to the 
Copenhagen interpretation. But von Neum ann would insist th a t there is no 
reality since without consciousness there is no reality created.
The Manv-Worlds Interpretation 
When there are several different outcomes possible, then all of them 
actually do occur. But each outcome occurs in its own universe. So in effect
iPor a more detailed discussion on quantum  logic, see H erbert, 177-
189.
2Por a discussion regarding such devices, see John von Neumann, 
Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1966); A. E. Wilder-Smith, The Scientific Alternative to Neo- 
Darwinian Evolutionary Theory (Costa Mesa, CA: TWPT Publishers, 1987).
3John von Neumann, M athematical Poundations of Q uantum  
Mechanics. Investigations in Physics, no. 2, trans. Robert T. Beyer 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955), 417-445; for a brief 
discussion, see Herbert, 189-190.
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the universe splits into as many distinct universes as there are possible 
outcomes when a m easurement is taken. ̂  This view avoids the m easurem ent 
problem by saying th a t there is no collapse of the wave function. But this is 
done by sacrificing the ordinary way of looking a t the universe.
It is interesting to note th a t whereas not even one world is possible 
according to the Copenhagen interpretation, according to the many-worlds 
view, num erous worlds are possible.^
iPor a more detailed discussion, see Bryce De Witt and R. Neill 
G raham , The Manv-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum  Mechanics (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).
^My own interpretation of quantum  mechanics and my reaction to 
other in terpretations have been deliberately left out because the conclusions I 
draw  in this thesis do not depend on them.
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CHAPTER IV 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
A Call for Caution 
It is tempting, based on the solid success of quantum  mechanics, to 
formulate a  “quantum  theology.” But one should be cautious since any 
successful theory, such as quantum  mechanics, may face a  fate similar to its 
predecessors “of being vanquished by another as long as science dotS not 
succeed in  emancipating from all histor}'.”! Various attem pts to achieve this 
emancipation and failures of such attem pts have been discussed elegantly by 
Stephen Toulmin.2 He further noted that.
Twice already [the Aristotelian paradigm and the Newtonian-Cartesian 
paradigm] theologians have committed themselves enthusiastically to 
the detailed ideas of particular systems of scientific theory. . . And, 
when radical changes to* k place in the natural sciences, they were 
unprepared to deal with them.3
Therefore, it seems wise to avoid generalizing too much from the
current model of science. We should heed the warning of M atthew Lamb not
to yield one’s heart to the “tempting myths of success” by evaluating “their
success as powerful enough to answer adequately all furthe?’ relevant
iRüdiger Buhner, “Paradigm Change: Some Continental 
Perspectives,” in Paradigm Change in Theology: A Proposal for Discussion, 
ed. Hans Kiing and David Tracy, trans. M argaret Kohl (New York: 
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questions or criticisms.” 1 It is especially im portant for theologians not to 
commit themselves to a particular scientific model and its details. I t will be 
better, according to Stephen Toulmin,
If theologians heed the sceptics, free themselves fi*om the seduction of 
‘new paradigm s’, and become firankly reconciled to being (in th a t sense) 
‘paradigmless’. It will be better if they distance themselves from the 
ideas of science rather than embrace them too systematically and 
uncritically.2
General Implication 
So what are the implications of quantum  mechanics for theology?
One thing th a t seems clear is th a t even if quantum  mechanics is replaced by 
another theory, th a t theory can never re tu rn  to the classical picture of 
reality .3 In particular. Bell’s theorem, which according to Peat is “an elegant 
way of tricking nature into revealing one of its secrets,” seems to indicate that 
the universe is “stranger than anyone could have imagined.”'* Therefore, it 
seems 'vise for theologians to avoid returning to the simple mechanistic 
picture of reality.
Whenever something is done one way or generally accepted to be true 
for a  long time, there tends to accumulate a bag of myths concerning it. 
Science is no exception. Apparent success makes it easier for science to 
accumulate much dross over the years. John W right correctly observes that
^Matthew L. Lamb, “The Dialectics of Theory and Praxis W ithin 
Paradigm  Analysis,” in Pm-adigm Change in Theologv: A Proposal for 
Discussion, ed. Hans Kiing and David Tracy, trans. M argaret Kohl (New 
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because of earlier victories of science over philosophy and theology, “science 
tended to induce an attitude of omnipotence in the scientific mind. W hatever 
could not be known by science was either unknowable or not worth 
knowing.” 1 In particular, it was the “awesome regularity of the mechanical 
universe as emphasized by Isaac Newton” th a t led to later intellectual 
development including deism.^ Also determ inism  inherent in  Newtonian 
physics influenced fields such as behavioral psychology. It is “ironical to see 
the resu lt of an idee fixee, discarded from the world of physics, held to 
religiously in a field where there was little reason to adopt it in the first 
place.”3 Q uantum  mechanics proves useful in identifying certain non- 
essential aspects of science which have been considered to be essential for a 
long time under the spell of success and which many theologians and 
philosophers still follow. This “demythologization” is extremely im portant for 
theologians who want to dialogue with scientists.
The situation is somewhat analogous to the American political 
system  in which the two-party system is dominant. It is easy for some to 
believe, in the light of many attem pted failures of third-party candidates in 
becoming elected, th a t the two-party system is an inherent p art of the 
political system in a country like the U.S. But now suppose th a t an 
independent candidate has won the election by a landslide. Even if he or she 
loses the electit n next time around, the myth of the two-party system as a 
necessary ingredient of the American political system is shattered
ijo h n  H. Wright, “Theology, Philosophy, and the N atural Sciences,” 
Theological Studies 52 (1991): 658.
^Russell, 626.
3Albert E. Smith, “Does God Play a t Dice?” Origins 4(1977): 39-40.
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irreparably. Similarly, even if quantum  mechanics is overthrown by a 
subsequent development, some myths about science can no longer be accepted 
without question.
Tentative N ature of Science 
First, quantum  mechanics has brought home the tentative nature of 
science. This is easy to understand when one looks a t the structure of science 
itself. But since the Newtonian paradigm had been successful for such a long 
time, and moreover all corrections seemed to come in the forms of 
modification, relatively speaking, rather than  in term s of revolution, a myth 
is created th a t science is a discipline concerned with discovery. This trend 
may even be traced from the time of Plato until the tw entieth century in 
having essentially the same framework concerning reality. According to 
Stephen Toulmin, this comprises a perm anent system with “a fixed and 
unchanging structure” th a t is ahistorical. ̂  Carl von Weizsacker term s this 
framework as seeing with a “divine eye” and states tha t quantum  theory 
makes this u n t e n a b l e .2 With quantum  mechanics, the historicization of 
science comes into the forefront of philosophy of science.^
Not only the implications of the theory of quantum  mechanics, but 
also the fact th a t the theory itself supplanted a rem arkably successful 
physical model (Newtonian physics) accentuates the reality th a t any 
accepted model in science, no m atter how successful, can be superceded by
iToulmin, 234-235.
^Buckley and Peat, 70.
^Even though Stephen Toulmin (see the article above) attributes this 
to Thomas Kuhn among others, I think tha t being trained in physics where 
quantum  mechanics is the basic language of research helped Kuhn shape his 
view.
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another model. Theologians should be careful, therefore, not to wed too much 
of their theological system with contemporary science if they do not w ant 
the ir system to become obsolete. This holds true even when the success of a 
model becomes enticing, as the history of science has shown.
Reductionism
Reductionism, too, can no longer be accepted as an essential p a rt of
science. W right properly raised this question:
Can we assume without argum ent th a t whatever is is mass/energy in 
space/time, built up into atomic, molecular, biological, psychological, and 
social relationships? Or does the world have other ways of being known 
and explained that are neglected by this approach? i
Many will answer affirmatively tha t quantum  mechanics is one non- 
reductionistic model which is perhaps the most successful one in the history 
of science in term s of experimental confirmation. Heisenberg made the 
following interesting remark:
Even if quarks [reductionistic elementary particles] should be found (and 
I do not believe that they will be), they will not be more elem entary than 
other particles, since a quark could be considered as consisting of two 
quarks and one anti-quark, and so on. I think we have learned from 
experiments th a t by getting to smaller and smaller units, we do not come 
to fundamental units, or indivisible units, but we do come to a point 
where division has no meaning.”̂
It is not necessary to go overboard and say reality is holistic since 
quantum  mechanics seems to be, because even quantum  mechanics is 
vulnerable of being overthrown. But it is a t least clear th a t one can do good 
science without being reductionistic in one’s approach. For theologians, this
iW right, 659.
^Buckley and Peat, 15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
m eans th a t one m ay adopt a reductionistic theological system but only as 
one’s preference, not as a  scientifically m andated system.
Determinism
Determinism no longer carries the weight it used to carry, especially 
under the Newtonian paradigm. That quantum  mechanics is not 
determ inistic is a  truism. For example, one can only predict probabilistically 
w hat the behavior of an  electron will be. In contrast, it was possible to give 
the exact prediction of the behavior of a given particle in Newtonian physics. 
The fact th a t quantum  mechanics has reigned supreme for quite some time 
now m ilitates against the position that science has to be deterministic. 
Theologians should not think, therefore, th a t to be scientific one has to have a 
determ inistic (closed) system.
Logic
Logic (as we understand it today) no longer seems to be absolute. 
From all the paradoxes it is reasonable to conclude th a t our logical system 
needs to go through some modifications, maybe even as dram atic as the 
revolution brought on by quantum  physics itself. This has profound 
implications with regard to rationality in general. According to Lamb, 
rationality can no longer be defined in a purely m athem atical sense. He 
further states tha t “the deductivist ideals of theory qua theory providing 
coherent and complete criteria for rationality are gone. . . . Rationality 
cannot be identified with ideals appealing to non-existent and impossible 
complete and consistent foundations in theory g£/a theory.” ̂  This may serve
iLamb, 70-71.
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as a  warning to theologians not to wed too much of their theology with the 
current model of logic itself.
Subiect-Obiect Dichotomy
Subject-object dichotomy no longer seems to be a necessary p art of 
science. According to Lamb,
An underlying assum ption which fostered this dichotomy between 
objectivity and subjectivity was a desire to reconstruct the methods of 
the natural sciences into formally logical, ahistorical procedures of ‘pure 
objectivity or ‘pure reason’ cut off from any trace of subjectivity. . . .  It 
seems to me th a t there is an emerging consensus about the illusory 
character of this imderlying presupposition of a logically pure 
objectivism in natu ra l science.
We have traditionally accepted this dichotomy and insisted th a t our 
science, and any other areas th a t aspire to be scientific, be ‘objective.’ But 
w hat the structure of science requires is th a t the predictions be testable, not 
necessarily objective. Moreover, quantum  mechanics shows th a t the 
separation of objectivity from subjectivity is not meaningful; this is shown 
clearly in observer-dependent phenomena. The participatory universe 
resulting from quantum  mechanics, more than  the mechanistic universe, has 
greater chance of reconciliation with religion, in which “knowledge is possible 
only by participation.”2
Realitv of the Obiects in a Scientific Model
Perhaps most importantly, ju st because a scientific model is 
successful one cannot conclude tha t the “objects” in the model are real 
entities. There is no guarantee of the reality of those objects either in the
llbid., 69-70.
2lan G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science. The Gifford Lectures, 
vol. 1 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990), 121.
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method of science or the practice of science. The only thing science requires is 
th a t the proposed model should work. Theologians should be careful not to 
wage war against science, assuming th a t a good scientific model is the true 
description of the reality. Ju s t because the Big Bang Theory is successful 
scientifically, it does not follow th a t this was how it actually did  happen, 
even though the theory itself gives a good theoretical framework to 
understand much of the observational data a t hand.
Assessment
W hat are some of the theological implications for these negatives? It 
is im portant to remember th a t realizing the limitations of science is not a 
weakness but a strength, a true sign of maturing. That this greater 
epistemological caution and hum ility is fostered by quantum  mechanics is 
evident by the attitudes of various scientists. Nevill Mott frankly admits 
that, “I am far from believing tha t science will ever give us the answers to all 
our questions.”  ̂ Many physicists are even open to the idea of God, be it to 
answer the origin question,^ or to address the need for God in the universe 
and one’s own life.^ Only after the myths of science are broken can a true 
reconciliation occur between science and theology.
iNevill Mott, “Science Will Never Give Us the Answers to All Our 
Questions,” in Cosmos. Bios. Theos: Scientists Reflect on Science. God and 
the Origins of the Universe. Life, and Homo sapiens, ed. Henry M argenau 
and Roy Abraham Varghese (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1992), 65.
^Geoffrey F. Chew, “Appeal to God May Be Required to Answer the 
Origin Question,” in Cosmos. Bios. Theos: Scientists Reflect on Science. God 
and the Origins of the Universe. Life, and Homo sapiens, ed. Henry 
M argenau and Roy Abraham Varghese (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1992), 36.
3Arthur L. Schawlow, “One Must Ask Why and Not J u s t  How,” in 
Cosmos. Bios. Theos: Scientists Reflect on Science. God and the Origins of
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Attempts to Draw Metaphysical Implications
It is im portant to mention th a t there have been many attem pts to 
draw some metaphysical implications of quantum  mechanics. Perhaps the 
most famous of these is by Fritjof Capra who attem pted to show sim ilarities 
between quantum  mechanics and Eastern religions. ̂  But it is my opinion 
th a t th is attem pt rests on shaky ground as discussed above.
Similarly, monism, dualism, and pluralism  with regard to the 
relation between science and religion appear to be too speculative.^ One may 
adopt any of these positions via theological arguments, but without claiming 
“scientific” status.
After looking at modem physics, Paul Davies stated th a t “it would be 
foolish to deny th a t many of the traditional religious ideas about God, man 
and the nature of the universe have been swept away by the new physics.
But th is will be reasonable if the current quantum  model is perm anent, and 
also if it truly does describe the reality. But according to the conclusion of 
this thesis, neither of these is necessarily so. Therefore, one can say Paul 
Davies’ conclusion does not logically follow from quantum  mechanics or any 
other scientific model. It is his own speculation.
the Universe. Life, and Homo sapiens, ed. Henry M argenau and Roy 
Abraham  Varghese (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1992), 107.
iCapra, The Tao of Phvsics: An Exploration of the Parallels Between 
Modem Phvsics and Eastern Mvsticism.
^Erwin Hiebert, “Modem Physics and Christian Faith ,” in God and 
N ature: Historical Essavs on the Encounter between Christianitv and 
Science, ed. David Lindberg and Ronald Numbers (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1986), 434-443.
3Paul Davies, God and the New Phvsics (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1983), 229.
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A more cautious approach was adopted by Willem Drees. He 
observed the following:
The presence of metaphysical ideas as partly  guiding research is possible 
due to the underdeterm ination of the theories by the present data. Such 
metaphysical differences about the nature of time or between the 
possibilities and the actualized realities seem to be persistent. It might 
be th a t one of the programs would become the new scientific consensus, 
are unm atched by the others. But even then, there could be different 
interpretations as long as people hold different metaphysical convictions. 
Differences in formalism have disappeared in  standard  quantum  theory, 
b u t it  still has its  variety of interpretations. ̂
Yet, Drees imposed an unnecessary restriction on theology when he
wrote, “Creatio ex nihilo should not be understood as referring to an event of
origination, for th a t is not in line with contemporary c o s m o l o g y . ”^ The same
criticism used against Paul Davies applies here also.
Ian Barbour tried to draw some metaphysical implications. His three
metaphysical implications are:
1. Temporality and historicity (Time as a fundam ental element of the
reality)
2. Chance and Law (quantum indeterminacy—unpredictable novelty)
3. Wholeness and emergence (holistic view of the reality ).^
Barbour’s conclusions seem very interesting and are quite suggestive
of a biblical view of the reality. But to take these too seriously is to commit 
the same m istakes th a t “Newtonian” theologians have made in the past.
1 Willem B. Drees, Bevond the Big Bang: Q uantum  Cosmologies and 
God (La Salle, IL: Open Court Pub. Co., 1990), 67.
2 l b i d . ,  2 0 3 .
^Barbour, 123-124.
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Conclusion
Fascination with w hat quantum  mechanics m ight m ean is not an 
exclusive domain of scholars. Robert Wright, in a recent popular magazine 
article, wrote th a t twentieth-century science has provided a fertile ground for 
“bona fide theological speculation; speculation about w hether the universe is 
a  product of intelligent design, whether the human experience is part of some 
unfolding purpose, w hether we were in any sense m eant to be here.”  ̂ He 
further observed th a t respect for metaphysics and respect for the unknowable 
are some of the results of the new science. He concluded his article as follows:
100 years ago, with Darwin having shown how a long chain of tiny 
accidents had happened to yield the hum an species, with metaphysics in 
re trea t and the clockwork laws of classical physics ascendant, and with 
the universe’s deft conduciveness to life as yet unfathomed, one m ight 
have thought “the theological possibilité'” an unlikely survivor of the next 
century’s science. T hat i t  should survive in such robust form would have 
seemed less likely still. This holiday season the unconventionally 
religious can join the conventionally religious in counting their 
blessings.2
But before one jum ps to facile conclusions, care m ust be taken not to 
draw too much from the cun ently successful scientific model. In my opinion, 
it was not the details of quantum  mechanics which gave rise to the above 
shift in thinking; it was, rather, the elimination of the various myths inimical 
to religion th a t gave rise to this shift. By eliminating the myths, quantum  
mechanics helped to envisage w hat Willem Drees called a “metaphysical 
conceptual space.” Therefore, the main benefit of quantum  mechanics for 
theologians is to clear away the myths concerning science, not to construct a
iRobert Wright, “Science, God and Man,” Time. December 28, 1992,
40.
2lbid., 44.
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quantum  theology.!
iThe focus of this thesis is almost exclusively epistemological. That 
is why so much effort is taken not to say any more than  warranted. On this 
level, i t  seems best not to appeal to various details of current scientific 
theories, except for "demythologization," no m atter how successful the 
theories may appear to be. But it is not my intention to say, via negativities, 
th a t one cannot use the quantum  model analogically or metaphorically in 
trying to understand the Reality. That one can do th a t follows from the unity 
of God, even though our understanding of science and  theology is imperfect. 
It my conviction th a t quantum  mechanics has brought the epistemological 
framework closer to a “biblical” epistemology than  has the Newtonian model. 
But this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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